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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

ROBERT M. SHEEN,

12645

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Mr. Sheen
for robbery entered pursuant to a jury verdict; in the
First Judicial District Court, in and for Cache County, the Honorable VeN oy Christoffersen, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant was charged by information with
the crime of robbery. Trial was held on July 20, 1971
before the Honorable V eN oy Christoffersen. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty. Robert M. Sheen was
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sentenced to a term of not less than five years or more
than life in the Utah State Prison on August 2, 1971.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State submits that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts the facts as stated by the ap·
pellant with the following additions and modifications.
Mr. J\1ortensen, the service station attendantvictim, testified at the trial that the gun employerl
"didn't look like there was just the straight barrel"
(Trial, p. 32). He further stated that the gun was defi·
nitely not a revolver and that the gun introduced was
positively the type of gun used (Trial, p. 32) . Though
defense counsel attempts to fabricate an inconsistency
in the facts, the record simply does not support the
position (See photographs of gun, State Exhibit No. 1) ·
1.

The exhibits referred to in Appellant's Brief
on page 2 are "mug shots" of eight individuals who had
been arrested on other occasions. The defendant's pie·
ture of January 5, 1968 is among them.
2.

Regarding the "show-up" set out on pages 2-3
of Appellant's Brief, counsel failed to mention that on
July 19, 1971 a hearing was held on a motion to sup3.

I

i

3

press the Ames' identification at the police station on
the l\Ionday following the robbery. The court granted
defense counsels' motion to suppress the identification
for the reason that appellant did not have counsel at
the show-up and had not waived the same. However,
the court held that all prior and subsequent identifications had adequate independent basis to be free of taint
from the shffw-up (Trial, pp. 3-4) .
Robert Bowers testified that he had loaned the
gun introduced in evidence to Gene Turner on the day
of the robbery (Trial, pp. 87-89). The gun which was
in the possession of Gene Turner on the night of the
robbery was returned to Robert Bowers with mud on
it (Trial p. 88).
.5

The mask used in the robbery and found on
the floor of the Yictim's car belonged to appellant's
father (Trial, pp. 67-76).
6.

7. The car which belonged to the robbers was
seen at the robbery scene by Kathryn Eliason (Trial
pp. 81-85), Charles Ames, (Trial, pp. 36-41), and Annetta Ames, (Trial, pp. 47-49) . The car described by
these witnesses was immediately recognized as belonging to Danny Wettstein by one of the investigating
officers (Preliminary I-Iearing, pp. 105-107). This car
was later located at the residence of Jim and Anne Fonnesbeck and had mud in the wheel-wells, (Trial, pp.
56-58).
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Anne Fonnesbeck identified Gene Turner as
having been with Danny
ettstein and Robert Sheen
on the night of the robbery (Trial p. 64). She testified
that the appellant, Wettstein and Turner admitted to
being at the site of the robbery and having "robbed the
place." (Trial 65) . Kirk 'V angsgaard testified to seeing appellant and the others together just prior to the
robbery (Trial, pp. 70-78).
The appellant (Trial, pp. 78-78) and Anne Fonnesbeck (Trial, p. 65), both testified that the three forementioned individuals were dressed in muddy clothes at
approximately 10:80 to 11 :00 p.m. the night of the robbery. l\frs. Fonnesbeck was asked to wash various
articles of clothing for each of the three individuals at
11 :15 p.m. the night of the robbery (Trial, pp. 9 2, 658.

''r
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66) .*
9.

Appellant implies in his statement of the facts
that Anne Fonnesbeck is not a credible witness because
she had "aided in the misprison of a felony." (Appellant Brief p. 3). It is implied that she was not being
truthful when she testified that appellant admitted in
her presence that he had been at the scene of the crime.
It is not respondent's purpose to retry the credibility of
this witness without a jury, but rather to add that Anne
Fonnesbeck was granted immunity from prosecution for
her testimony of the events of that evening, some of
which were admitted to by appellant (Trial, pp. 78-79).
*The robbery occurred between 10:00 and 10:16 p.m. (Trial, pp 15-17
and 54).
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1\Irs. Fonnesbeck's immunity was known to the jury at
the trial (Trial, pp. 62-63).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DENIAL OF COUNSEL AT PRETRIAL
SH 0 'V I N G IS NOT PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE WITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS
HAD A SUBSTANTIAL INDEPENDENT
BASIS.
The Supreme Court decided before United States
t'. TVade, 388 U.S. 218 ( 1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 ( 1967) that even constitutional
error need not be reversible error and may indeed be
harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966).
The Supreme Court of Utah established the rule that
an in-court identification may be valid if based on independent judgment even though a prior line-up identification may be deemed invalid. State v. Vasquez, 22
Utah 2d 277, 279 ( 1969) . The record in this case clearly shmvs that such independent basis for identification
existed for the Ames' identifications. As regards the
possibility of misidentification or prejudice resulting
from the method used by the officers in this case, two
points need be made.
First, the Supreme Court held that identification of
robbers by witnesses viewing mug shots was proper.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In
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that case "[a]t least six photographs were displayed to
each witness. . . . Tihere is no evidence to indicate that
the witnesses were told anything about the progress of
the investigation, or that the FBI agents in any other
\vay suggested which persons in the pictures were under
suspicion." at 385.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the following elements significant in establishing an independent basis for identification in Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 257 N.E.2d 921, 923:
1.

Time of observation by witness.

2.

Distance of witness from the defendant.

3.

Clothing, hair and complexion.

4.

"Positive" identification by witness m
court room.

5.

Time between act and statement to police.

6.

Significance of differences with testimony
on the stand.

7.

When witness was shown mug shots, she
was positive that defendant was not there.

8.

Time between robbery and trial.

The l\Iassachusetts court held that the witnesses
had adequate independent basis for identification after
viewing appellant for Yz to I minute at a distance of
4Yz feet. This statement was given to officers within 20
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minutes of the crime and in-court identification was four
months after the crime.
The record of the present case shows that l\'Ir.
Ames observed appellant for 2-3 minutes at a range of
one-two feet (Trial pp. 36-37). He gave a description
to officers within 30 minutes of this observation. Indeed
Mr. Ames had been more than a frightened observer to
an armed robbery, he stood shoulder to shoulder with
appellant and worked with him to free the car that was
stuck. The in-court identification followed the crime by
four months.

TV ade and Gilbert are now widely recognized not
as an absolute bar to any and all identifications which
may be directly or indirectly connected with an improper lineup, but rather as limiting the possibility of
misidentification. Any identification which has an independent basis, even though connected with a improper
lineup is admissible.
The second point about the method of conducting
the pre-lineup identification has to do with the claim by
appellant that he was "unfairly prominent" in the
group of pictures shown. (Appellant's Brief p. 5). This
seems to be the heart of appellant's position on Pomt
I. The factual basis for the claim is set forth on page
four in Appellant's Brief in these words:
"Of the eight photographs shown the
Ames, only three showed both a front and profile view of the subject, and of those showing
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both a front and profile, only exhibit I, depicting defendant-appellant herein, showed an individual with light, or blond hair coloring. It is
thus submitted that the opportunity of each of
these witnesses had to observe the perpetrator
at the scene of the crime was not of a type to
inspire confidence; on the contrary their opportunity was extremely poor. It is further submitted that this conclusion is not altered by
their subsequent identification from photographs. Of eight photographs shown the Ames,
only three showed both a front and profile
view of the subject, and of those showing both
a front and profile, only eJJhibit I, depicting
defendant-appellant herein, showed an individual with light or blond hair coloring. It is
thus submitted that the identification from pictures was in itself 1mfair in that it unduly
called attention to the defendant-appellant and
that the witnesses' identification from these
pictures cannot, accordingly, be considered as
in any •u:.:ay showing an independent basis for
their
identification of defendantappellant herein."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5).
In fact, this is not borne out as a view of the photographs will reveal.
Photographs G, I and L could easily be seen as
representative of a person with "light or blond hair
coloring." A front and profile view is not more prejudi-

9

cial than a front vievv alone. It should also be remembered that the police were looking for at least two
suspects, not just a blond one. Also the photograph of
appellant shows him with very short hair. That l\<Ir.
Ames could so conclusively identify appellant from this
photograph clearly shows that he had adequate independent basis for his identification. In absence of any
evidence that officers did anything to suggest anything
about either the progress of the investigation or the
identity of any suspects, there is no reason shown for
overturning the considered decision of the trial court.
Thus, appellant fails to make any factual showing of
truth to his claim.

POINT II
ADMISSION OF THE WEAPON WAS
PROPER AS RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND
EVEN IF IMPROPER, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The record clearly shows that the weapon was not
introduced for the purpose of showing "that defendantappellant was the one who actually went into the service station and threatened the attendant with a pistol"
as appellant argues in his brief (Appellant's Brief, p.
6). A robbery was committed and a weapon used (Trial,
pp. 17-18). Three individuals were shown to have been
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together before and after the robbery (see Statement
of Facts, p. 4). The car used by the robbers and identified by eyewitnesses belonged to one of the three. The
mask used and left at the scene belonged to one of these
three. The day of the robbery a gun "like" the one described by the victim, vms loaned to one of these three.
Appellant makes much of the uncertainty in the minu
of the victim, whose life was being threatened, because
he could not say that the weapon so questionably entered was "the" weapon used to threaten his life. Indeed, appellant argues that despite all else, this uncertainty alone justifies reversal or dismissal! Not so,
the State argued simply that the weapon be admitted
"for whatever weight it bears with the jury." (Trial,
p. 89). Indeed, were it admitted erroneously, this piece
of evidence would not change all the other facts which
persuaded the jury to return a unanimous verdict of
guilty.
Also, of interest is this analysis of a similar problem in our sister State of California. Therein, a witness
identified a sawed-off shotgun as being "similar" to one
of the guns used in a robbery. The court held that:
"There was overwhelming physical evidence and circumstantial evidence connecting
each defendant with the robbery as well as the
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testimony of the co-conspirator, Joe Cooper
directly implicating each defendant in the robbery, so any error in the admission of the shotgun was harmless beyond reasonable doubt."
People v. Peters, 86 Cal.Rptr. 521, 525
(1970).
How like the instant case, where circumstantial evidence and the testimony of lVIrs. Fonnesbeck implicates
and connects appellant with the scene of the crime. In
this case too, there was no error in admission of the
weapon and even if there were error, it would be harmless because the result of the trial would have been the
same.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing facts and authorities,
the State respectfully submits that Robert l\f. Sheen
received a proper trial. The evidence in the record shows
conclusively that the identification of appellant by witnesses before his arrest and at trial had adequate independent basis. Therefore, none of appellant's substantial
rights were prejudiced when he was denied counsel at
a station-house show-up. The weapon was not erroneously admitted. There was no error in the trial as alleged by

appellant and even if there were, it would be non-preju-
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dicial to appellant's substantial rights beyond reasonable doubt.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for Respondent

